Addressing the social care crisis in the United Kingdom : the 'magic bullet' of telecare policy by Eccles, Andrew
Eccles, Andrew (2017) Addressing the social care crisis in the United 
Kingdom : the 'magic bullet' of telecare policy. In: 13th International 
Symposium & 2017 Annual Conference on Social Policy, 2017-08-18 - 
2017-08-21. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/63172/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Addressing the social care crisis in the United Kingdom: the 
 ?ŵĂŐŝĐďƵůůĞƚ ?of telecare policy 
Andrew Eccles 
School of Social Work & Social Policy, University of Strathclyde, United 
Kingdom 
 
13th International Symposium & 2017 Annual Conference on Social Policy, 
August 18-21, 2017, Nanchang, China 
The most recent comprehensive report about social care for older people in the United 
Kingdom ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŝŶĂ ‘precarious state ? in terms of the quality of care 
provided, the crisis in funding, and significant evidence of a lack of dignity afforded the 
recipients of care services (Care Quality Commission, 2017).  The report argues that:  
  ‘It appears to be increasingly difficult for some providers to deliver the safe, high 
quality and compassionate care people deserve and have every right to expect. With 
demand for social care expected to rise over the next two decades, this is more worrying 
than ever [and offers a] stark warning that adult social care is approaching a tipping point 
[..] driven by more people with increasingly complex conditions needing care but in a 
challenging economic climate, facing greater difficulties in accessing the care they need ?
(Care Quality Commission, 2017: 1)  
Of 4,000 nursing homes inspected in England, which care for the most vulnerable people at 
the end of their lives, 32% were rated inadequate or requiring improvement and 37% were 
advised they had to improve safety (ibid.) 
This assessment of a crisis in social care for older people in the United Kingdom is neither 
new, nor confined to residential care; in 2011 evidence from the enquiry into home care 
provision in the United Kingdom by the Equality and Human Rights Commission painted a 
bleak picture of often impersonal, very time-limited and inconsistent care delivery in which 
the potential for relationships to develop between carers and older people appeared to be 
increasingly remote (EHCR, 2011). ^ŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĞƌĂŽĨ ‘ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƉƌĞǀĂŝůĞĚŝŶ
public finances of the United Kingdom, the changing demographic of a greater number of 
older people, in particular the increase in the numbers over the age of 85, has introduced 
more complex needs in the provision of adult social care. At the same time, there has been 
a decline in funding: 
  ‘In real terms, the National Audit Office estimates there has been a 7 per cent 
reduction in spending on adult social care by local authorities between 2010 and 2015 and 
the House of Commons Library has calculated that real terms funding fell by 8.4% between 
2010 W11 and 2016 W17 ?(HoC, 2017: 47:6) 
This combination of circumstances has led to the recent observation by the chair of the 
National Care Association ƚŚĂƚ ‘There is not a crisis in adult social care [..] we are now 
beyond the crisis point. We really are at the edge of the cliff [..] (Collinson, 2016). This crisis 
has long been anticipated and yet successive United Kingdom governments have declined to 
address fundamental financial, cultural or structural change to deal with it, preferring 
instead regular organizational restructuring (Hudson & Henwood, 2002).  However the 
prospect held out by remote care technologies, such as telecare - particularly for the care 
and well-being of older people - emerged in the early part of this century in government 
thinking. Since 2006, there has been a Telecare Development Programme in the United 
Kingdom, with a similar programme of Telemedicine technologies being implemented in the 
delivery of health care in the community. Telecare policy now sits at the strategic heart of 
the delivery of care services.  
 
Care policy in the United Kingdom is a complex admixture of family input, use of the private 
sector, voluntary organisations and the State (see Phillips, 2007 for an overview). Of these, 
the State has long played the dominant role in health care provision and  W albeit in more 
complex ways in terms of funding and delivery  W a major role in social care. This role played 
by the state in the United Kingdom should also be seen in the context of comparatively 
(certainly in European terms) low levels of obligation placed on family members to take 
responsibility  W either in a legal or cultural sense - for their ageing parents (Rowntree, 1995; 
Saraceno and Keck, 2008).  Thus Governments, saddled with rising demand but also seeing 
opportunities for innovative forms of care for older people have pushed ahead with the 
remote care technology agenda. Albeit there are different political jurisdictions across the 
United Kingdom, care technologies such as telecare are, in policy terms, universally seen as 
not only a possibility but a necessity, and policy discourses have proceeded on that basis. 
The Telecare development program of the Scottish Government (2008:6), for example, 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĂƚďǇƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ ? ? ? ? ‘ƌĞŵŽƚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵ
home will be thĞŶŽƌŵ ?. The United Kingdom has not been alone in exploring this agenda of 
 ‘ĐĂƌĞĂƚĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?WŽůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ďƵƚit has been pre-eminent in global terms in the scale of 
the endeavour, the assumptions made of its potential, and is perceived as a world leader in 
both the use and manufacture of these technologies (Department of Health, 2012a).  
 
These remote care technologies are geared towards the perceived health and care needs of 
different client groups - such as older people, disabled people and people with long term 
conditions - and are widely assumed by technologists and change managers in health and 
social care to have the capacity ƚŽŝŵƉĂĐƚďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůůǇŽŶĐůŝĞŶƚƐ ?ůŝǀĞƐ ?KĨƚŚĞƐĞĐůŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŽůĚĞƌ
people are by far the most likely recipients - given their care needs, but also because 
demographic change and attendant costs are rarely far from discussion about these 
technologies. The technologies have developed ƌĂƉŝĚůǇŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĚĞĐĂĚĞĨƌŽŵĂ ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨďĂƐŝĐĂůĂƌŵƐ ?ĚĞtectors and passive sensors in houses, to current 
manifestations such as the tracking of ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛmovements in their homes and real-time 
monitoring of long term health conditions. In its more recent guise, using GPS based 
technologies, telecare technologies can track the movements, and health status, of people 
outside ƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚƵƐĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƐƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ?ĨŽƌ
example, the onset of memory loss, other cognitive impairment, or chronic conditions of ill-
health. These technologies now cover social care, health care and rehabilitation, spawning 
the use of the (often imprecise and overlapping) categories telecare, telehealth and tele-
rehabilitation. There is some merit to these demarcations but, following an approach more 
likely to found in European research (see for example Pols and Willems, 2012), this paper 
uses telecare as an umbrella term for these different aspects of remote care technologies in 
ƚŚĞŝƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ- often overlapping - health, social care and rehabilitation 
needs.  
There is clear evidence of benefits to be derived from the use of telecare technologies. For 
service users these benefits include greater continued independence, autonomy and 
enhanced connectivity with others (Fisk, 2003; Mols & Poser, 2005; McCreadie & Tinker, 
2005; Loader, Hardey & Keeble, 2009; Moser, 2012; Pols, 2012).  There is also evidence of 
advantages for carers, particularly in relation to reducing pressure on caring roles and aiding 
connectivity (Yeandle and Fry, 2010).  Apart from benefits to individuals and carers, financial 
savings generated through the use of telecare technologies have the potential to release 
funds for other applications, thus offering opportunities for better targeting of resources. As 
the Audit Commission  W guardian of public finance expenditure in the UK  W noted at the 
outset of telecare development, the use of these technologies represents the unusual 
possibility of providing cost savings at the same time as better service provision (Audit 
Commission, 2004).  Subsequent to the Audit Commission report both governments and 
technology companies in the United Kingdom have explicitly promoted the move to telecare 
technologies based on two factors; increased cost savings, and enhanced quality of life (see 
Eccles et al (2013) for a more detailed discussion). 
Subsequent to the Audit Commission offering its assessment of the potential to be 
afforded by these technologies, a substantial critical literature has emerged. This 
literature has broadly focused on two issues: the lack of discussion around the wider 
social impact of telecare and reservations about the decision making processes involved 
in the scale of telecare programmes - what Mort, Roberts and Milligan (2009: 85) argue is 
ĂŶ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĚĞĨŝĐŝƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĨŝĞůĚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂƌŝƐĞŶĚƵĞƚŽĂƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
research and development of advanced care technologies that has not been accompanied 
by sufficienƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?dŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝƐŵĂĚĞĂůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚƌŝǀĞŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
agenda, an approach noted by Pols and Willems (2012:6), who argue that, in coming to 
terms with these technologies, 
   ‘The dubious status of promises and the unpredictable processes of domestication 
that are so hard to trap with standard research methods, make implementing telecare 
technologies on a large scale and on a top-down basis, as is done in the UK, a hazardous 
invĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?
 
The overriding hazard to which these authors allude is that the interaction between telecare 
technologies and their end users is complex and requires implementation based on 
appropriateness of purpose, nuance in understanding and fine adjustment to end-user 
needs. This assessment by Pols and Willems is based on their extensive research with users 
of telecare technologies in the Netherlands. Their findings are echoed in research from 
Finland (Soderlund, 2003), Norway (Moser, 2012), Spain (Mort, Roberts and Callen, 2013) 
from further research on the situation in the Benelux countries (Oudshoorn, 2011; Pols 
2012; Kamphof, 2013a). A third, related, area of critical comment has centred on the actual 
lived experiences of the recipients of telecare technologies  W for example from the research 
in the United Kingdom by Greenhalgh et al (2013), a richly detailed phenomenological 
enquiry into service users ? experience of telecare technologies. These studies note the 
potential benefits but at the same time uncover significant unanticipated complexities in 
their implementation, which require attention to small scale specifics of how individual 
users perceive of, and function with, these new technologies. This complexity in practice 
requires space for debate and reflection, neither of which has been readily available in the 
ambitious scale of government sponsored telecare policy in the United Kingdom. The 
 ‘hazard ?, then, is in understanding and responding to the quality of the care experience for 
users of telecare services. In a policy world of fiscal scarcity and reduced social care budgets 
(see Mort, Roberts and Blanca (2013) on telecare use in an era of austerity), it has been 
assumed there may be distinct gains from the use of telecare technologies for governments 
and policy officials charged with reducing costs, one of the reasons why policy 
implementation has moved so rapidly. This has encountered a further potential hazard, in 
that this push for such high levels of telecare engagement, representing, as it does, often 
profound shifts in types of care and care relationships, comes against a backdrop of very low 
recognition by the public about these technologies; a 2012 survey of adults in the United 
Kingdom indicated that 91% had not heard of either telecare or telehealth. Of those 
surveyed who were aged 55 or over - the most likely recipients of these technologies  W 93% 
had heard of neither. The evidence from other European countries is that telecare 
technologies work in some contexts, with some people at some stages in their lives, a 
sentiment which has also emerged from researchers looking at the situation in the United 
Kingdom (Eccles, 2010; Mort and Roberts, 2011; Newman, 2011). The contrast between this 
uncertainty in the research about the outcomes of using telecare technologies with the 
policy position of the United Kingdom governments is clear, whether with the ambitions of 
the 3millionlives programme in England or the commitment from the Scottish Government 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘telehealth will be widely recognised by service users and their carers as the route to 
greater independence and quality of ůŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ?).  
 
Despite a substantial critical literature around telecare policy and its implementation, there 
has been very limited theorizing about telecare in relation to policy analysis. Fujimoto 
(2000) explores the issue in a case study of Japan, where the objective conditions  W an 
ageing population and strain on financial and labour resources  W make for an obvious case 
for the use of these technologies. But betwixt policy objectives and implementation 
&ƵũŝŵŽƚŽ ?Ɛstudy makes clear there are numerous complexities at play, which means 
implementation has fallen short of policy intentions. This has resonance with the position in 
the United Kingdom too; very significant claims that have not been realised in practice. 
Barlow (2012) has explored the organizational complexities of policy delivery in some detail 
via a case study approach. This paper will explore this disjuncture in terms of policy analysis. 
It draws on a wide range of policy commentary and empirical data around implementation 
to help locate telecare in a more theoretical, policy analysis, light.  
A lack of theoretical sophistication on the part of policy makers themselves has become a 
common theme across public policy, via an under appreciation of complexity, and an over 
reliance on assumptions of linearity ?ƐǆǁŽƌƚŚǇŶŽƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ about policy 
making: 
  ‘WŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐŝĚĞntify a priority and the broad outlines of a solution ...; Policy-makers ... 
design a policy to put this into effect, assembling the right collection of tools: legislation, 
funding, incentives, new institutions, directives; The job of implementation is then handed 
over to a different group of staff, an agency or local government;  ...the goal is (hopefully) 
achieveĚ ? ?h<ĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚin Exworthy 2008: 319). 
It will be argued here that due complexity was not adequately considered, nor factored into, 
policy framing and implementation of telecare policy. This is reflected in the actual 
experience of telecare policy itself and has become one of the key reasons for its failure to 
be realised in practice in the terms policy makers set for it. Of more concern (since policies 
often fail at the implementation stage) is the way in which telecare was assumed to be a key 
solution to the impending crisis in social care; its failure to materialise as anticipated has 
likely now exacerbated the scale of this crisis. 
 
Policy theorizing 
A multitude of models can be drawn upon to help theorize about policy making (see Cairney 
(2013) for a detailed overview). Across these different models there is some overlap but 
also considerable debate. Indeed, the desiraďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚĞŽƌŝǌŝŶŐ has been 
challenged (John, 2012) as almost inherently contrary to the actual messiness of policy and 
implementation. Nonetheless, this paper does employ a theoretical model, albeit a broad 
framework in the form of Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) (Kingdon, 1995 ). A Multiple 
Streams Approach to understanding policy formation and implementation has been used in 
related fields (see Exworthy et al (2010) for example); its strength lies in the conceptual 
space it affords for thinking through how well particular policy has progressed according to 
its initial objectives. Although originally conceived as a model to illuminate an 
understanding of policy formation, it has more recently been employed to explore, in 
addition, policy implementation (which can, in any case, rarely be separated out from policy 
itself); see Boswell & Rodrigues (2016) and Ackrill et al (2013) for its application in this 
sphere. 
Kingdon introduces the MSA ďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ĂŶŝĚĞĂǁŚŽƐĞƚŝŵĞŚĂƐĐŽŵĞ ?ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐ
a fundamental reality about an irresistible movement that sǁĞĞƉƐŽǀĞƌŽƵƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
(Kingdon, 2014: 1). As Cairney notes, he goes on to argue that this underestimates the 
complexities of actual policy change and the limited  ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶthis 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĐŚĂŶŐĞŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?dŚĞŬĞǇƚŽ<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ Walthough 
Kingdon himself emphasises that this is often an imprecise schemata  W is the simultaneous 
congruence of three separate streams ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵďŝŶĞƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚŝƐ ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?:
the problem stream, the policy stream and the political stream. The problem stream is 
where  W amidst a myriad of potential policy claims  W a very few particular policies develop 
momentum, sometimes in response to an impending crisis, and aided by the ability of policy 
advocates to demonstrate that a well thought-out solution is available at hand. The policy 
stream is where this perceived solution takes hold among policy makers and, as Greenhalgh 
et al (2012) note, may emerge as a dominant discourse in the policy field. In the politics 
stream, policy makers have the motive and opportunity to pursue the ideas toward actual 
policy on the ground. As this paper will argue, the politics stream may involve the use of 
policy instruments to try to ensure compliance at the implementation stage, given that the 
gap between policy and implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) is a well-recognised 
phenomenon. Crucially, Kingdon argues, these three streams of problem, policy and politics 
ŚĂǀĞƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇŝŶĂ ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇǁŝŶĚŽǁ ?ĂŶĚĂƐǆǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ? ?08: 322) notes, 
 ‘The ability of policy-ŵĂŬĞƌƐƚŽ ‘Ĩŝǆthe window open [..] will largely determine the long-term 
viability of the policy ?. So the variables here will be the co-incidence of the three different 
streams with a given window of opportunity. It is the absence of congruence across these 
variables which presents a challenge to policy success.  
One of the critical reflections on MSA (Cairney, 2013; Rawat & Morris, 2016) is that its 
broadness may not highlight some of the specifics and complexities of a given policy 
between policy and implementation; in other words it has a wide scope, which is useful in 
allowing policy to be theorized, but limited in utility around the depth of this capacity to 
theorize. But the obverse of that is that its very scope will allow capture of enough overall 
understanding to make initial theorizing possible and accessible.  
This paper, then, applies MSA to telecare policy, as a way of unpacking what, in terms of the 
policy claims made for it, has been an area of very varied policy success. It does so by 
looking at the policy proposal evidence and empirical outcomes of the policy as it has been 
implemented. The paper will then note some wider social outcomes of what has happened 
with telecare implementation, in that the unwarranted assumptions around its efficacy and 
levels of use have allowed policy makers to bypass fuller consideration of perhaps the most 
pressing contemporary issue in social care; how the care needs of a rapidly changing 
demography are to be met with the dignity that older people ought to be afforded (and 
which is enshrined in legislation). In short, the policy rubric around telecare assumed 
seamless solutions to care demands verging on a  ‘ŵĂŐŝĐďƵůůĞƚ ? solution, too readily willing 
to buy-ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵĚŝƚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛputative narrative about the possibility of telecare 
leading to both cost savings and enhanced quality of life. The evidence here is perforated 
with ambiguity, and a decade of this assumption around efficacy has allowed the provision 
of social care in the United Kingdom to assume critical levels of inadequacy. It has also 
allowed  W based ŽŶ ‘ŵĂŐŝĐďƵůůĞƚ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ- for complexities around choice, ethical decision 
making and the unintended consequences of the policy - such as social isolation - to be 
largely side-lined, as research on the issue has predominantly been pursued within a 
narrow, and methodologically restricted, remit.  The discussion starts with an outline of the 
formation of telecare policy.  
 
The policy problem 
As Cairney and Zahariadis (2016) note, MSA considers how policy solutions are 
received within government or wider policy networks. One of the problems here is the 
ŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŝĚĞĂƐ ‘ǁŚŽƐĞƚŝŵĞŚĂƐĐŽŵĞ ?ĨŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇ
the policy itself but its implementation will display an irresistible logic which brooks little 
reflection about its suitability or the complexities of its implementation. In MSA thinking this 
represents the problem stream stage, where the policy problem  W in this case care needs in 
a rapidly changing demographic  W met what was perceived to be a policy solution already 
available and waiting to be taken up. This is an important aspect of the policy development; 
the gap between the urgency of a policy idea and the protracted process of finding solutions 
(which may require a long gestation) is most effectively bypassed by the adoption of an 
existing presumed solution. In the case of telecare the evidence base for presuming the 
efficacy of the solution was thin when the idea  ‘whose time has come ? was promoted by the 
Audit Commission in 2004, which held up the prospect of telecare as simultaneously a 
solution to care demands but also cost savings. But thereafter a policy was rapidly 
developed by government which made serious assumptions based on not only on an idea 
 ‘ǁŚŽƐĞƚŝŵĞŚĂĚĐŽŵĞ ?ďƵƚŽŶĂůŝŶĞĂƌŝƚǇŽĨŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽn. On both counts the actual 
experience was much less clear cut; other countries  W notably, for example, Germany - faced 
with similar demographic change did not embrace telecare as policy solution with the same 
air of policy necessity and instead explored alternative themes such as inter-generational 
contracts of support for older people (Eccles, 2015).  
The key actors in the policy stream stage all had sound reasons to coalesce around the 
telecare solution. Albeit central government had devolved responsibility of social care to 
local government over the previous decade, long term social care policy, both in the 
community and in residential settings remained identified with the government at the 
centre in terms of public perception over responsibility for taking the policy lead in this area 
(Means et al, 2008). This was also the case because local government in the United Kingdom 
(the component parts of the United Kingdom have different arrangements but the issue 
remains universal) is, comparatively in European terms, unusually reliant on central 
government, rather than local taxpayers, for its funding. Local government itself  W which 
would become the lead agency in implementing telecare policy  W was enthusiastic about 
promoting telecare, as it had struggled with perennial problems around the under-
resourcing of adult care. But a third  W and major  W policy actor was the commercial sector, in 
the shape of manufacturers of telecare equipment. In this regard the United Kingdom was a 
world leader, and so the nexus between central and local governments and manufacturers 
began to develop a mutually reinforcing discourse around how telecare was essential as a 
policy solution and was able to address both cost, and quality of life, criteria in such a crucial 
policy area.  
Thus the spaces for discussion around a multiplicity of issues  W for example the ethics of 
using surveillance technologies, and the efficacy of telecare use in terms of operability and 
presumed cost savings - became limited by the ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
decision making (Callen et al, 2009). This is noteworthy in the United Kingdom context, 
where, for example the Scottish Government rapidly developed a formal  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚ
the leading United Kingdom telecare technologies company Tunstall, such that this 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐůŽŐŽĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŽŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? Tunstaůů ?ƐůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ
(2009, p3) notes that the United Kingdom faces a  ‘ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƚŝŵĞďŽŵď ? where the social 
and healthcare needs of increasing numbers of older people would outstrip the resources 
required. Similarly, local authority commissioners of technology were apt to talk of the 
unsustainability of current patterns of care delivery; taken together, a discourse based on 
the necessity of technological solutions for future service delivery quickly emerged. Indeed 
the Scottish Government explicitly argued ƚŚĂƚ ‘dĞůĞĐĂƌĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ŐƌŽǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇĂƐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?(Scottish Government, 2008 p6) despite the lack of any significant research 
evidence about telecare use at that point. As noted below  W in the wake of a great deal 
more research evidence which suggests ambivalence around the results of telecare in 
practice  W the Scottish Government position on its projections to 2020 remains largely the 
same (Scottish Government, 2015). Here then we have a relatively closed circle of expert 
opinion: government, partner technologists and local care commissioners reinforcing each 
other ?Ɛ largely uncontested discourse. But the discourse around the implications of 
demographic change, for example, is contested in academic circles (Walker, 1993: Tinker, 
1999) and challenges precisely some of these assumptions about the necessity of 
technology-based care. 
 
This relatively closed discourse extents to evaluations of telecare. Policy evaluations are 
usually retrospective of actual implementation and thus limited in scope given the 
outcomes of implementation required by the policy makers. In one major evaluation for the 
Scottish Government, Beale (2012) notes that, of three possible methods that could have 
been used to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the policy, the least robust was used, given 
the complexities and uncertain variables inherent in the data under evaluation. In Investing 
to Save: Assessing the Cost Effectiveness of Telecare (Clifford et al, 2012: 10) the authors 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵŶĐŝůƐƐŚŽƵůĚĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚĞůĞĐĂƌĞĂƐĂ ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ŝŶůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĐĂƌĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵŶĐŝůƐƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ
of assessment and training in the applicability of telecare within their re-ablement and 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘dƵŶƐƚĂůů
assessors suggested apprŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚĞůĞĐĂƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽƐƚƐŽĨdĞůĞĐĂƌĞǁĞƌĞ
ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĨŽƌĞĂĐŚĐůŝĞŶƚƵƐŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇdƵŶƐƚĂůů ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?
 
In both these studies the limitations of data mining and use of methods suggested by, or in 
conjunction with, technology companies are made explicit and open in the findings. The 
point is that they contribute to a discourse set within the context of expert opinion within 
the policy stream. As Callen et al (2009) note, public space for debate about the desirability 
of these technologies, their implications for care relationships, and aspects of privacy largely 
sit ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵŽĨƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐƐĞƚďǇ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ?Thus in the policy stream phase policy 
advisers and technologists tended to inhabit a world in which these complexities  Wsuch as 
alternative ethical approaches, open democratic spaces for debate and alternative 
paradigms about how we address future care needs (based, for example, on the relationship 
between work and care) - were rarely addressed. In this sense the policy stream element of 
the Multiple Stream Approach coalesced smoothly, and alternative discourses around 
telecare were effectively marginalised (Greenhalgh et al, 2012). 
 
The third strand of the MSA is represented by the politics stream where policy makers have 
to balance a variety of implementation factors such as interest group representation, 
feedback from research trials and the competing political demands of other policy areas. It 
is here, at the political level, that the policy moving into implementation aspect becomes 
more complex. Various political problems emerged in the telecare implementation process, 
but the logic of the policy stream coalition, discussed above, tended to side line, diminish, or 
indeed distort these political problems, for example in the use of raw data to skew the 
results of the WSD research (Greenhalgh, 2012a).  The first of these political problems to be 
discussed here is the emerging research evidence. 
 
The scale of ambition for the use of Telecare technologies in the United Kingdom was 
illustrated by the Whole System Demonstrator (WSD) project, the largest telecare research 
programme undertaken anywhere in the world to date, at a cost  W funded by the  UK 
government -  of £31m ($61 at 2009 exchange). This project variously involved a randomised 
control trial (RCT) of telehealth and telecare users across three sites in England, with data 
collection over twelve months and analysis over a further twelve.  The results of this 
research came after the announcement of the ambitious telecare policy proposals outlined 
above. It is not in the remit of this paper to explore the WSD results in detail; suffice it to say 
the first three tranches of WSD reporting between 2012 and 2013 offered results on cost 
savings and quality of life enhancement which are ambivalent, were sometimes at odds with 
the current policy, and open to debate (Innes et al, 2012). A less ambivalent assessment of 
the  research emerged from the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, which 
reported, that  ‘dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁĞĚŶŽƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚŽƌƐŽĐŝĂů
care use between the telecare and non-ƚĞůĞĐĂƌĞŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ P ‘dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ
of the telehealth eĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚƚĞůĞŚĞĂůƚŚǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŽƐƚ-effective at 
ƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚƌŝĂů ? (2013 n.p.). In addition to the results, the WSD trial itself, 
by dint of its research design, managed to avoid political input at the political stream stage; 
in other words by basing the research only on clinical factors, and not also around social and 
ethical considerations, the political stream element was effectively closed to political 
argument in favour of a technical evaluation which considered only operating efficacy and 
not social impact.  
Despite this, the United Kingdom telecare policy programme moved on: the telecare 
programme in Scotland, projecting forward to 2020, noted the need to:  ‘DĂǆŝŵŝƐĞĂŶĚ
increase the use of telehealth and telecare to improve access for citizens to planned and 
ƵŶƉůĂŶŶĞĚĐĂƌĞ ?(Scottish Government, 2012: 26), whilst the United Kingdom Prime Minister 
at the time, speaking in December 2011 ?ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞůĞĐĂƌĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ P ‘We've 
trialed it, it's been a huge success and now we're on a ĚƌŝǀĞƚŽƌŽůůƚŚŝƐŽƵƚŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝĚĞ ? 
(Gov.UK, 2011 n.p.). This rather sweeping announcement was made on the basis of claims 
by the UŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐDepartment of Health involving, as Greenhalgh (2012: 
 ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘cherry-picking of unanalysed data to put on its website before the trial had 
ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁĂƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞďƵƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶƚ ? ?dŚĞ
political expediency reflects the decision to undertake an ambitious telecare program 
without a sufficient evidence base, but perhaps also reflects the powerful nexus between 
the UK governments and technology companies at the policy stream level. Nevertheless 
even this nexus of policy stream interests W what Greenhalgh (2012: 344) has termed  ‘an 
increasingly powerful industrial-political complex¶- has proved to be problematic. There are 
a number of reasons for this, succinctly discussed by Barlow (2012): thus, albeit the United 
Kingdom has been a world leader in both the adoption and manufacture of telecare 
equipment, the industry remains fragmented and without a single market leading product.  
Part of the problem that arises from this is the lack of inter-operability of equipment, a 
weakness repeatedly found by Greenhalgh et al (2013) in their qualitative research around 
the experiences of telecare end users. There has also been scepticism on the part of the 
ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞt^ƚƌŝĂůƐƚŚĞ
health care professionals, especially in the more professionally powerful areas such as 
clinical medicine, are well acquainted with the full results of the trials (for example in the 
reporting of GP magazine, aimed at general practitioners) and so have not been convinced 
that the evidence base is robust enough.  
Organizational problems also exist at the political stream level. Despite decades of attempts 
at organizational change, relationships between health care and social care across the 
United Kingdom, but particularly England, remain stressed. There are many factors involved 
here (see Eccles, 2013 for an overview) but key to the problem with telecare 
implementation has been the lack of financial congruence across health and social care 
budgets. Thus telecare, as the WSD research demonstrated, albeit it is not cost-effective at 
scale, can bring about a reduction in emergency hospital admissions. The cost savings here 
accrue to health services. But the costs of the provision of telecare equipment are most 
often borne by social care budgets which reside in local authorities and not health 
organizations. There would need to be either a transfer of funds across the two budgets 
(that is, health paying for telecare in its social care capacity) or a pooling of health and social 
care funds. The latter has been implemented in Scotland (although is in its nascent stage 
and is not short of complexities  W see Black, 2015) but not in England. A further 
organizational complication has been the major reforms to health care arrangements in 
England which, in an attempt to foster greater access for private companies to engage with 
health delivery, have resulted in significantly more fragmentation of delivery. So the 
organizational needs of the telecare industry  W for predictable and sustained take up of 
products - have not been served by parallel policy developments elsewhere. As Barlow et al 
(2012: 14) note from their research:  
  ‘The cost of remote care services was frequently raised not only as a barrier to 
adoption but also in relation to the evolution of a remote care industry and market. 
Competition amongst technology suppliers has emphasised technology development but 
also the cost of solutions to service providers. The challenge for suppliers is how to balance 
Ă ‘ŽŶĞƐŝǌĞĨŝƚƐĂůů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ W with sufficient adaptability to respond to future patient needs 
and expectations  W and a mass-customised model designed around the specific needs of 
end-users but using standardised components ? ? 
Nonetheless, at the policy stream level policy officials at the Department of Health (DH) 
continued to plan for the provision of telecare based on financial calculations that were 
simply not borne out by the evidence of the WSD trials. The DH assumptions were based on 
a projected two million regular users of telecare with financial savings coming from fewer 
hospital admissions (GP 11 June 2012 http://www.gponline.com/telecares-12bn-savings-
remain-doubt/article/1135469). But the unknown costs here were the additional financial 
pressure of keeping erstwhile patients in the community: these community care costs were 
ŶŽƚĨĂĐƚŽƌĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ŵĂŐŝĐďƵůůĞƚ ? thinking behind this 
approach was revealed, more startlingly, in the request of the journal of General 
Practitioners, GP, for a breakdown of cost assumptions behind the telecare programme. The 
journal reported that:   
  ‘The DH [Department of Health] originally blocked GP's request for the evidence 
behind its savings claim, but published a summary of its calculations after an appeal. It said 
disclosing the full evidence would 'be a prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs, 
given that the information soƵŐŚƚŝƐŝŶƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůĨŽƌŵĂƚ ? ? ? ?GP, 2012 n.p.) 
 
The policy stream response to this political stream weakness of implementational 
uncertainty in the telecare industry was the announcement, in 2012, of the 3 million lives 
project (DH, 2012).  This was a Government announced, but largely industry-led, policy 
concordat which aimed to have three million users of telecare devices in England by the 
year 2017. In part it can be seen as an attempt by policy makers to engage with the telecare 
industry ŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐŽĨ
future markets (and thus their reluctance to invest in product development). But it also 
represented a reboot of the telecare policy programme. The 3 million lives programme 
rationale was clear: 
   ‘dŚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?, ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚůŽŶŐ
term conditions and/or social care needs could benefit from the use of telehealth and 
telecare services. Implemented effectively as part of a whole system redesign of care, 
ƚĞůĞŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚĞůĞĐĂƌĞĐĂŶĂůůĞǀŝĂƚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵE,^ĐŽƐƚƐĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
quality of life through better self-ĐĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŚŽŵĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ? 
A more detailed reading of aims reveals the underlying industry concerns, however: 
x For DH and industry to work together over the next 5 years to develop the market 
and remove barriers to delivery.  
x For DH to create the right environment to support the uptake of telehealth and 
telecare including rewarding organisations for adopting and integrating these 
technologies in services by developing a tariff.  
x For industry to work with the NHS, social care and other stakeholders to simplify 
procurement and commissioning processes for telehealth and telecare services at 
scale.  
x To put the NHS and UK industry at the forefront of telehealth and telecare globally, 
developing significant opportunities for UK plc. 
 
Three aspects of this are worth commenting on, in terms of the lack of congruence between 
policy and political streams. First, the weaknesses of implementing telecare cost effectively, 
as illustrated by the WSD trials, are simply not addressed. This is ?ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ‘magic bullet ? 
thinking; in the event of countervailing evidence, policy makers simply doubled down. As 
Hendy et al (2012: 1) note: 
  ‘The implementation of a complex innovation such as remote care requires it to 
organically evolve, be responsive and adaptable to the local health and social care system, 
driven by support from front-line staff and management. This need for evolution was not 
always aligned with the imperative to gather robust benefits evidence. This tension needs to 
be resolved if government ambitions for the evidence-based scaling-up of remote care are 
to be realised ?. 
Second, given the evidence already discussed about organizational complexities, the 
programme offered no organizational solutions beyond a series of aspirations, similar to the 
programme in Scotland which announced of future policy that telecare will be the preferred 
option.  
Third, the projections were indefensibly optimistic. As Hunn (2012) has noted, the projected 
global figure for telecare use for 2017, based on comparable definitions of the technologies, 
was only 1.8 million. Hunn argues P ‘Trying to target numbers is not helpful.  We could deploy 
3 million devices quite easily, but most would sit gathering dust or be hidden in the back of 
drawers [..] the aim should be about achieving a better quality of life for patients.  dŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚ
about ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐĨŽƌĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇǁĞ
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĂƚĂŝŶƚŽŽƵƌǁĂǇƐŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? (ibid: 5). 
In order to galvanise the political steam into meeting policy aspirations, policy makers 
introduced a number of policy instruments (see Bouscombes & Le Gales, 2008: Bemelmans-
Videc et al, 2003 on the policy instrument literature) around telecare policy. These 
instruments  W carrots, sticks and sermons  W to use the title of the Bemelmans-Videc text  W 
were designed by a variety of measures to encourage adoption of policy in the political 
stream. Key to this in the instance of telecare was the use of performance indicators.  The 
problems with using a performance indicator culture have been widely noted. Smith (1995), 
in his seminal work, indicated the unintended consequences of performance indicators, 
ranging from the need to accommodate centrally driven targets that do not necessarily 
meet the needs of particular localities, to the propensity to operate gaming strategies to 
meet current and future requirements of indicators. A more recent literature (Quereshi, 
2001; Miller, 2011) has expressed misgivings about outcomes measurement that are driven 
from the centre by policy makers, but which are not adequately connected to actual 
outcomes which reflect the needs of service users themselves. Of course this latter 
approach to outcome measurement would necessarily be contextual and often localised. A 
striking example of this tension in the United Kingdom context came from the Scottish 
experience, where local Telecare Partnerships were able to engage with the performance 
indicator data requirements only with considerable difficulty (Beale, 2011; Eccles, 2011). In 
one particular partnership, where the Telecare programme predated the central push from 
Scottish Government after 2006, local outcome measures and ethical frameworks had 
already been established. This partnership took the decision that the data required (for 
example, hospital bed days saved through the use of telecare technologies) from 
Government at the centre  W at the heart of the policy stream - required such a simplification 
of the actual decision making process around implementation that the figures would simply 
lack validity. Other Telecare project managers offered similar misgivings (Eccles, 2013). Thus 
whilst this particular Telecare partnership was lauded within Scottish Government telecare 
literature as an exemplar of good practice, it ranked simultaneously as  ‘in need of 
improvement ? in the Scottish Government performance indicator rankings because it had 
failed to return outcome figures, demonstrating an incongruence between the policy 
instruments employed by the policy stream and politics stream.  
A further series of complexities at the implementation stage reflect the linear assumptions 
made by policy makers about policy delivery, although in this case these complexities were 
exacerbated by the way in which government funded research evidence was, as noted 
ĂďŽǀĞ ? ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇƉŝĐŬĞĚ ?ƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞĚŽŵŝnant policy discourse behind the efficacy of 
telecare solutions to care needs. What became apparent, as the roll out of telecare 
proceeded, was that the social and ethical questions of its use were side lined. As Hendy et 
al (2012: 1) note about the WSD trials, these issues were not considered due to the 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ǀŝǌ ? ‘While remote care was successfully rolled-out, 
wider implementation lessons and levels of organisational learning across the sites were 
hindered by the requirements of the RCT ?. 
These telecare technologies, based as they increasingly are on surveillance (for example 
through monitoring of conditions or GPS tracking of movements) - and in the new care 
relations they presage - prompt ethical issues hitherto unexplored: the ethical and 
democratic deficit previously noted by Mort, Roberts and Milligan (2009: 85). 
Social research, drawing more heavily on qualitative methods has identified a multitude of 
complexities in the use of telecare in its social context. The phenomenological enquiry with 
end users by Greenhalgh et al (2013) reveals particular deficiencies with the inter-
operability of different pieces of equipment but also the complexities of telecare efficacy 
where recipients have multiple morbidities. Mort Callen and Roberts (2013) note the 
pressure on end users to use the equipment  ‘appropriately ? or potentially have it withdrawn 
from them; the ƵƐĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĚĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ďǇƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌs was 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂůĞƌƚfunction for social interaction - essentially having 
someone to talk to in the remote response centre.  
These complexities and tensions between telecare policy and practice go beyond the 
experiences of just service users. A distinctly under-researched area has been the 
experience of carers and care workers, who are increasingly expected to engage with these 
new technologies. Eccles ? (2013) research reveals significantly different attitudes to care 
technologies, and their utility in replacing human care, across a range of professions who 
are engaged in the assessment of service users for potential telecare installation. There is 
unpredictability here across various fronts. There may be differences in attitude across age 
groups which are more or less familiar with new technologies, but also across different 
caring professions  W for example health and social care  W which are now expected to assess 
older people for the potential of using technology based care, and between family members 
and technology recipients over the suitability of these technologies. Thus, while monitoring 
equipment may offer extended families and carers peace of mind, it may simultaneously 
represent an intrusion into the privacy of recipients. What we have here is a need for more 
qualitative research on the actual experience of care professionals, carers and clients in 
understanding how, when and why these technologies are used and how the various parties 
to their use experience them. There exist limited, and essentially surface, accounts of client 
satisfaction (see, for example, Scottish Government, 2009) but a paucity of research based 
on more depth of enquiry. Where these deeper case studies do exist  W particularly from the 
Netherlands, but alƐŽDŽƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶEŽƌǁĂǇ- they point to the complexity of 
operationalizing telecare technologies and the intricate, often unpredictable consequences 
of the interface between technologies, their users and care practitioners. Oodshourn (2011), 
and Kamphof (2013), offer findings from research with carers and practitioners, which adds 
further layers of complexity. This is particularly the case with the second and third 
generation telecare technologies (which provide copious data from the monitoring of 
service users in their own homes or via GPS), where sifting the data and responding to its 
implications may be approached quite differently by different carers and care professionals, 
giving rise to new concerns about the responsibilities of care professionals who have access 
to data but may be overloaded by its sheer volume. Kamphof also notes the tensions that 
arise between practitioners and their managers, where practitioners feel confident to sift 
(and thus order) data in the face of more managerialist concerns (see Meagher and Parton, 
2004, for a discussion of this tension), that all data ought to be recorded and interpreted. 
DŽƐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚĐĂƌĞƌƐƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƐĞƚŽĨŝƐƵĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚŝƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐĂƌĞƌƐĂŶĚĨĂŵŝůǇ
members who feel a particular benefit from technologies that are keeping theiƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?
movements and health condition monitored, this carries unforeseen additional pressures: 
checking equipment, interpreting movements and having additional care responsibilities 
(Moser, 2012).  
At the policy stream level, quality of life (QoL) is explicitly included, by both industry 
representatives and policy makers, as an intended policy outcome of the deployment of 
telecare technologies (TSA, 2010; Scottish Government, 2011). But these claims around QoL 
need to be tempered by a clearer understanding of the complex factors which contribute to 
QoL measurement (see Eccles et al, 2013). Among these, QoL among older people is 
influenced by social networks and friendship. Yet telecare technologies  W with their 
potential to replace human care with monitoring and surveillance equipment  W have the 
potential to lead to social isolation, potentially a key factor in the reduction of QoL for older 
people (ibid). Albeit social isolation does not necessarily, in itself, equate to loneliness, 
loneliness will usually be predicated on social isolation. The associations between loneliness 
and an increase in a serious decline in indicators of good health have been well documented 
(see Eccles, 2015 for a summary). Thus addressing one public policy problem - the cost of 
social care and the desire to have older people in community settings -  may have 
unintended disadvantages for recipients ? health.  
Quality of life was also the subject of enquiry by the WSD project (see above). Its authors 
noted:   
  ‘[I]f telehealth leads to improved self care behaviour and efficacy, we might expect 
increases in health related QoL and reductions in negative affect. It remains unclear 
whether improvements in these patient reported outcomes are driven primarily by 
objective improvements in physical health, or by subjective improvements in perceptions of 
agency or control. Telehealth could reduce health related QoL and psychological wellbeing 
owing to the increased burden of self- monitoring, concerns about intrusive surveillance, a 
perceived lack of user friendliness, or the undermining of the traditional (face-to-face) 
therapeutic relationship [..] our findings strongly suggest no net benefit from telehealth; 
therefore, it should not be used as a tool to improve health related QoL or psychological 
outcomes ? ?ĂƌƚǁƌŝŐŚƚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
Thus we can observe a multitude of complexities among user experiences; both service 
users and practitioners. These indicate a clear disjuncture between the policy steam 
assumptions of efficacy and the political stream experience of a wider user group, 
summarised in a detailed discourse analysis around telecare between technologists and 
users (Greenhalgh et al, 2012). These authors also stress the need for greater participation 
over the design and functionality of telecare technologies at the policy stream stage in order 
that there might be greater congruence with political stream factors. Indeed, as Barlow et al 
(2006:403) note, drawing on the organizational complexities in the development of telecare 
policy on the ground,  
  ‘^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞĐĂƌĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ
projects because of the degree of autonomy in decision making held by care professionals 
and the amount of coordination which is required between different care professionals and 
services. Health and social care services involve diverse staff from differing organisations, 
possessing differing cultures and values. These need to be closely involved if pilot projects 
are to be inƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ? ? 
 
Conclusion 
Reviewing the research of a number of qualitative and organizational accounts indicates 
that assessment for, planning, delivery, and operation of telecare with end users at the 
politics stream level is significantly more complex than is held to the case at the policy 
stream level where policy and industry discourses prevail. In terms of Multiple Streams 
Approach, there is a clear lack of congruence across these two streams, which is 
problematic given tŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŽůĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?
that is afforded policy change. The problem here lies with the determination of the policy 
stream elements, in particular policy makers and manufacturers, to press ahead with 
implementation before thorough trials were conducted and moreover, to redouble the 
effort in the face of evidence that was, at best, ambiguous. The reliance on a narrow 
methodological focus side lined crucial areas of concern around telecare use; the ethics, the 
user experience and the wider cost impact on community based care. The selective use of 
data to bolster the policy stream discourse has been egregious, but what is possibly of 
greatest concern is the lost opportunity to address the pressing issue of a crisis in the 
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƌĞĨŽƌŽůĚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ‘ŵĂŐŝĐďƵůůĞƚ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
around telecare over the past decade has meant that fundamental structural problems of 
the financing and organization of such care have simply been postponed rather than 
tackled. The application of a  Multiple Streams Approach has afforded the opportunity to 
begin to theorize on why this has been the case; in essence the issue in ƚŚĞ ‘problem 
stream ? remains, but the circular and reinforcing arguments and research enquiry of actors 
in the policy stream have singularly failed to engage with the inconvenient complexities of 
the political. 
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